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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
 The Indian River School Board (the “Board”) has a 
long-standing policy of praying at its regularly-scheduled 
meetings, which are routinely attended by students from the 
local school district.  Appellants argue that the Board‟s policy 
is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.  The Board claims that a school board is like a 
legislative body and that its practice of opening board 
sessions with a prayer is akin to the practice that was upheld 
in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  In Marsh, the 
Supreme Court held that Nebraska‟s practice of opening 
legislative sessions with a prayer was not a violation of the 
First Amendment‟s Establishment Clause.  The issue in this 
case is whether a school board may claim the exception 
established for legislative bodies in Marsh, or whether the 
traditional Establishment Clause principles governing prayer 
in public schools apply.  The District Court agreed with the 
Board‟s conclusion that its actions were constitutional under 
Marsh.  For the reasons that follow, we will reverse.   
 
I.   
 
A.  Procedural History  
 
The complaint in this case was originally brought by 
two sets of plaintiffs who lived and sent their children to 
school in the Indian River School District (the “District”), 
located in southern Delaware.  The first set of plaintiffs, 
Mona and Marco Dobrich, brought suit individually and on 
behalf of their son, a twelve-year old.  Dobrich v. Walls, 380 
F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (D. Del. 2005).  The Dobriches were 
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residents of the District.  Their son had completed grades one 
through five in the district school.  The second set of 
plaintiffs were Jane and John Doe, who also brought suit 
individually and as parents of Jordan and Jamie Doe.  Id.  At 
the time the Complaint was filed, Jamie Doe was a student at 
a District elementary school.  Jordan Doe, who had 
previously attended middle school in the District but 
transferred to another school, planned on returning to a 
District high school.  Id. at 371, 373. 
 
Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against multiple defendants, including the Indian River 
School Board and the Indian River School District.
1
  The 
Dobriches and the Does alleged violations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution stemming from 
various Board and District actions, including the Board‟s 
practice of opening its meetings with a prayer.  Plaintiffs 
noted that students regularly attended these meetings and 
argued that the Board‟s prayer policy was therefore 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.  In addition, 
the Complaint challenged other allegedly unconstitutional 
practices: 
 
Plaintiffs allege that school sponsored prayer 
has pervaded the lives of teachers and students 
in the District schools. Plaintiffs allege that 
                                                          
1
 Plaintiffs also named as defendants the board members 
individually and the District Superintendent and Assistant 
Superintendent in their individual and official capacities.  
However, the suits against the parties in their individual 
capacities were later dismissed.  
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prayers have been recited at graduation 
ceremonies, athletic events, potluck dinners, ice 
cream socials, awards ceremonies, and other 
events. Plaintiffs also allege that District 
employees have led three different Bible Clubs, 
one for sixth grade students, one for seventh 
grade students and one for eighth grade 
students, and that students involved in these 
clubs have received “special privileges” like 
donuts and being able to head the lines to lunch. 
Plaintiffs further allege that at least one 
elementary school in the District distributed 
Bibles during the 2003 school year, and that 
religion has become part of the District‟s 
curriculum in that several teachers have referred 
to religion during their classes. 
 
Id. at 371.   
 
 Plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including 
compensatory and nominal damages, a declaratory judgment 
stating “that the customs, practices, and policies of the 
District with regard to prayer at School Board meetings and 
school functions are unconstitutional, both facially and as 
applied” and injunctive relief “banning Defendants from 
promoting, conducting, or permitting religious exercises or 
prayer at school functions, including but not limited to 
graduation ceremonies, athletic activities, holiday festivals, 
awards presentations and School Board meetings” and 
“requiring the District to distribute its school prayer policies 
publicly and to establish procedures for reviewing violations 
of the policy.”  Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 685 F. Supp. 
2d 524, 526 (D. Del. 2010).  
8 
 
 In January 2008, the parties reached a partial 
settlement.
2
  With the exception of those relating to the 
Board‟s practice of beginning every School Board meeting 
with a prayer, the parties settled all of their claims.  The 
settlement was approved.  In March of 2008, the Dobriches 
moved out of the District and voluntarily dismissed the 
remainder of their claims, leaving only Jane and John Doe, 
individually and as the parents of Jordan and Jamie Doe, as 
plaintiffs in the case.  In April 2008, the Does and defendants 
submitted cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue 
of whether the Prayer Policy was constitutional.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.  It is 
this order that we now review.  
 
B.  The Prayer Policy  
                                                          
2
 At the motion to dismiss stage, the District Court dismissed 
the claims against the defendants in their individual capacities 
and held that some of the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue 
some of the claims.  The court held that the Dobrich children 
lacked standing to pursue claims for prospective damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief, Dobrich, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 
373, but had standing to pursue claims based on past 
constitutional violations, id. at 374.  However, Marco 
Dobrich had standing to bring an action for damages and 
injunctive and declaratory relief as it pertained to the Board‟s 
Prayer Policy.  Id. at 374.  As for the Doe plaintiffs, they had 
“standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief with 
respect to the alleged religious practices of the School District 
and School Board” for which they were personally present.  




The heart of this case is, obviously, the prayer policy 
and practice of the Indian River School Board.  The Indian 
River School District was created in 1969.  Prayers have been 
recited at the meetings since that time.  Although the Board 
prays at every public meeting, it does not pray at its closed-
door or executive sessions.  For thirty-five years, no written 
policy governed the Board‟s prayer practice.  Then, in 2004, 
the Board decided to formalize this practice.  
 
The Board‟s decision to write an official prayer policy 
was the result of a heated community debate about the 
propriety of prayer at local high school graduations and at 
School Board meetings.  See Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 
528-29.  In June 2004, Mona Dobrich complained to the 
Board about the recitation of prayer at her daughter‟s high 
school graduation.  Dobrich‟s complaint and the reaction it 
generated caused the Board to become concerned that it might 
be the subject of a lawsuit.  Id.  This led the Board to 
“solicit[] legal advice regarding the constitutionality of [its] 
practice of opening . . . regular meetings with a moment of 
prayer.”  Id. at 529.  The Policy was drafted and presented to 
the Board‟s Policy Committee.  In October 2004, the Board 
adopted the Policy by vote. 
 
The resulting “Board Prayer at Regular Board 
Meetings Policy” (“the Policy”), reads as follows:  
 
1. In order to solemnify its proceedings, the 
Board of Education may choose to open 
its meetings with a prayer or a moment 
of silence, all in accord with the freedom 
10 
of conscience of the individual adult 
Board member.  
 
2. On a rotating basis one individual adult 
Board member per meeting will be given 
the opportunity to offer a prayer or 
request a moment of silence.  If the 
member chooses not to exercise this 
opportunity, the next member in rotation 
shall have the opportunity.  
 
3. Such opportunity shall not be used or 
exploited to proselytize, advance or 
convert anyone, or to derogate or 
otherwise disparage any particular faith 
or belief. 
 
4. Such prayer is voluntary, and it is among 
only the adult members of the Board.  
No school employee, student in 
attendance, or member of the community 
shall be required to participate in any 
such prayer or moment of silence.  
 
5. Any such prayers may be sectarian or 
non-sectarian, denominational or non-
denominational, in the name of a 
Supreme Being, Jehovah, Jesus Christ, 
Buddha, Allah, or any other person or 
entity, all in accord with the freedom of 
conscience, speech and religion of the 
individual Board member, and his or her 







 While the Policy formalizes the Board‟s decades-long 
practice of praying at public meetings, the practice 
surrounding the recitation of the prayer is essentially the same 
as it was prior to the enactment of the formal policy. 
 
 The Policy reflects the long-standing tradition of the 
Board of rotating the responsibility for reciting the prayer (or 
leading the moment of silence) among the board members 
that have volunteered for the role.  The Policy states that the 
prayer is “voluntary” and “among only the adult members of 
the Board.”  JA 062.  In practice, the Board President asks 
members to volunteer to lead the prayer or the moment of 
silence.  The Board President is responsible for keeping track 
of which member gave a prayer and thus ensures that the 
opportunity is rotated between the volunteering members.  A 
few days before the regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board 
President reminds the next person on the rotation that it is his 
or her turn to recite a prayer.  When new members are 
elected, the Board President asks them to inform him if they 
wish to participate in the prayer rotation.  The Policy also 
ensures that a prayer or moment of silence always occurs at 
the meetings, because “[i]f the member chooses not to 
exercise this opportunity, the next member in rotation shall 
have the opportunity.”  JA 062. 
 
 The Board meetings usually begin with a call to order 
and a roll call.  This is followed by the presentation of the 
colors and delivery of the prayer.  Since the official Prayer 
                                                          
3
 “JA” refers to the Joint Appendix. 
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Policy was enacted, it has become customary for a board 
member to offer a disclaimer between the presentation of the 
colors and the prayer.  The purpose of the disclaimer is to 
“ensure that any members of the public in attendance 
understand the purpose of the prayer policy.”  Appellee Br. 
11.  Appellees offer the following, read on November 16, 
2004, as an example of a typical disclaimer: 
 
It is the history and custom of this Board, that, 
in order to solemnize the School Board 
proceedings, that we begin with a moment of 
prayer, in accord with the freedom of 
conscience of the individual adult members of 
the Board.  Further, such prayer is voluntary 
and just among the adult members of the School 
Board.  No school employee, student in 
attendance or member of the community is 
required to participate in any such prayer or 
moment of silence.  
 
JA 0349.   
 
C.  Structure, Duties, and Practice of the Board 
 
In support of their contention that the Board functions 
as a legislative body, the defendants direct our attention to the 
Board‟s composition, responsibilities, and power, which are 
set forth in Delaware law.   
 
The Indian River School District serves the Delaware 
towns of Selbyville, Frankford, Dagsboro, Gumboro, 
Fenwick Island, Bethany Beach, Ocean View, Millsboro, and 
Georgetown.  See 14 Del. C. § 1068.  It is divided into five 
13 
electoral districts.  Id.  The District is made up of fourteen 
schools, employs 646 full-time teachers, and serves 
approximately 8,388 students.  Of these fourteen schools, 
there are “several elementary schools, two middle schools, 
two high schools, and an arts magnet school.”  See Indian 
River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 527. 
 
Under Delaware law, a school district is “a clearly 
defined geographic subdivision of the State organized for the 
purpose of administering public education in that area.”  14 
Del. C. § 1002(5).  The Indian River School Board has “the 
authority to administer and to supervise the free public 
schools of the [Indian River School District]” and has “the 
authority to determine policy and adopt rules and regulations 
for the general administration and supervision of [said 
schools].”  Id. § 1043.  The Board is composed of ten 
members, who serve three-year terms.
4
  See id. § 1068(f).  
Two members are elected by the qualified electors of each 
district.  Id. § 1068(b), (g).  Board members are unpaid.  Id. § 
1046.   
 
Delaware law requires the Board to hold “regular 
meetings . . . each month during the year.”  Id.  § 1048(a).  
Special meetings may also be held “whenever the duties and 
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 At the time the District Court opinion was issued, the Board 
members were:  “Robert D. Wilson and Shelly R. Wilson 
(District 1); Patricia S. Oliphant and Vice President Kelly R. 
Willing (District 2); Randall L. Hughes II and Nina Lou 
Bunting (District 3); President Charles M. Bireley and Dr. 
Donald G. Hattier (District 4); and Donna M. Mitchell and 
Reginald L. Helms (District 5).”  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 
2d at 527.   
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business of the school board may require.”  Id.  § 1048(b). 
The Indian River School Board holds its regularly-scheduled 
meetings on school property.  The policy making 
responsibilities of the Board are extensive and touch nearly 
all aspects of a student‟s life.  The Board must:  (1) 
“[d]etermine the hours of daily school sessions; the holidays 
when district schools shall be closed; the days on which 
teachers attend educational improvement activities;” (2) set 
the educational policies for the school district; (3) “prescribe 
rules and regulations for the conduct and management of the 
schools;” (4) enforce school attendance requirements; (5) 
“[g]rade and standardize all the public schools under its 
jurisdiction and . . . establish kindergartens and playgrounds 
and such other types of schools; (6) “[a]dopt courses of 
study;” (7) “[s]elect, purchase, and distribute” textbooks and 
other school supplies, furniture, and equipment; (8) 
“[p]rovide forms” for employees to make reports to the 
school board; (9) submit required reports to the Secretary of 
Education; (10) “appoint personnel,” id. § 1049; (11) provide 
for the care and repair of school property, id. § 1055; and (12) 
adopt rules governing use of school property and oversee 
requests for use of school property, id. § 1056. 
 
The District also has the power to spend money for the 
“support, maintenance and operation of the free public 
schools.”  Id. § 1702.  Although the District receives funding 
from the state general assembly, id. §1701, it is also 
empowered, through the Board, to levy and collect additional 
taxes for “school purposes.”  Id. §§ 1902, 1914. 
 
The Board‟s minutes confirm that at its meetings it 
hears commentary, discusses, and votes on a wide variety of 
issues affecting local schools.  For example, at any given 
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meeting, the Board may discuss curriculum development, 
changing the length of the school day, capital improvements, 
increases or reductions in staffing, and financial matters.  The 
minutes also disclose that students regularly attend the Board 
meetings.  While the number of students attending the Board 
meetings fluctuates during the year, at least some students 
attend nearly all of the meetings held during the school year.  
Board President Charles M. Bireley—who, with the exception 
of a two-year period, has sat on the board continuously since 
1974—estimated that at certain meetings there may be 50 
students in attendance while at others there are “very few.”  
JA 389.  In his calculation, on average “a couple of dozen” 
students attend each meeting.  Id. 
 
Generally speaking, there are six reasons why a 
District student might attend a Board meeting.  First, students 
facing disciplinary action for serious offenses are permitted to 
speak with the Board directly in connection with their 
situation.  The Board deals with student disciplinary actions 
at the closed-door portion of its public meetings. 
 
Second, students belonging to one of the two Junior 
Reserve Officers‟ Training Corps (“JROTC”) programs at the 
local high schools attend every meeting to perform the 
“presentation of the colors.”  This tradition started sometime 
in 2000, when the JROTC programs at Sussex Central and 
Indian River High Schools were created.  Typically, the 
principal of the school where the meeting is being held will 
inform the ROTC students of the location and date of the next 
meeting. 
 
Third, students attend the School Board meetings in 
their formal role as student government representatives.  
16 
Sometime between 1993 and 1995, then-Board Member 
Richard Cohee submitted a motion to make presentations 
from student government representatives an official part of 
the meetings.  The motion passed; the Board now regularly 
devotes a section of its agenda to presentations from student 
government leaders and their comments are reflected in the 
minutes.  The usual practice is for a representative from each 
of the two high schools in the district to attend the meetings.  
The Board President will “invite the student government 
representatives to come forward to speak.”  JA 395.  During 
the school year, student government representatives address 
the Board at “most meetings.”  JA 395.  However, there 
“ha[ve] been meetings when [the Board] did not hear from 
the [student government] representative.”  JA 500.   
 
Fourth, students also attend the meeting to perform a 
piece of music or theatre for the Board‟s benefit.  These 
performances are a regular feature of the meetings. 
 
 Fifth, the Board meetings are routinely used to 
recognize individual or team achievement.  It is for this 
purpose that the greatest numbers of students attend the 
meetings.  At the meeting, the student‟s name will be called 
out and he or she will be presented with a letter signed by the 
Superintendant and the Board President commemorating his 
or her accomplishment.  Photographs are also taken, which 
may be published in the local newspaper.  The Board then 
records each student by name in the minutes, which are 
posted on the school district website.  Prior to 1994, these 
types of awards were given out at student assemblies. 
 
 The record contains countless examples of these types 
of awards.  The Board has recognized a broad array of student 
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activities, including Odyssey of the Mind tournament 
winners, art contest winners, scholarship recipients, all-state 
sports teams, JA 271, other athletic achievements, and 
musical achievements.  These awards are such an important 
part of student life that Board President Bireley was not 
aware of any instance where a student declined to attend the 
meeting to receive an award, other than for a scheduling 
conflict.  In fact, the awards portion of the Board meeting has 
become so lengthy that the Board has received complaints 
from its members about the excessive time spent on this 
portion of the meeting.  There has been informal discussion 
about limiting the number of awards given out or eliminating 
this portion altogether in order to decrease the meeting time. 
 
 Finally, every Board meeting concludes with a public 
comments section that students may also attend.  This portion 
of the meeting provides members of the community with an 
opportunity to “come and talk to [the Board] about things that 
[are] on their minds, concerns, or anything like that or have 
input.”  JA 394. 
 
D.  The Content of the Prayers 
 
 It is in this environment that the School Board delivers 
its prayers.  The Policy places several limits on the prayers 
that are recited.
5
  By its terms, it permits a wide range of 
prayers—they “may be sectarian or non-sectarian, 
denominational or non-denominational” and may refer to 
specific religious entities by name.  JA 0062.  However, the 
                                                          
5
 These limitations, of course, also apply to the moments of 
silence, although in practice they are obviously aimed at 
regulating spoken prayer.  
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prayer may “not be used or exploited to proselytize, advance 
or convert anyone, or to derogate or otherwise disparage any 
particular faith or belief.”  JA 0062. 
 
 While by its terms the Policy permits nearly any type 
of prayer, the record shows that the prayers recited at the 
meetings nearly always—and exclusively—refer to Christian 
concepts.  The record contains several examples of prayers 
given by different Board Members.  On February 22, 2005, 
Board Member Helms recited the following prayer:  
“Heavenly Father, Lord our God. Heavenly Father, please 
help the Board with the problems in the School District that 
we are going through right now. We ask these things in Jesus‟ 
Name.”  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 530.  In June 2006, 
a Board Member offered the following prayer: 
 
Dear Heavenly Father, among Your many 
blessings, we thank You for the beautiful 
summer weather and especially for the much 
needed rain. We thank You also for the 
wonderful school year that has just ended with 
so many successes, awards, and 
accomplishments of our students and staff once 
again. We ask Your continued blessings on 
those among us who have devoted so much 
time, energy, and expertise to the betterment of 
this district and who are now stepping down. 
Given [sic] them peace, health, and happiness in 
the days to come. Be with our people who have 
suffered illness or injury this year, and grant 
them a quick return to normal life. Comfort the 
families of those who are lost to us and give 
them strength in their time of grief. Protect all 
19 
who are here and return them to us safely in the 
fall. We ask that You continue to guide and 
direct us in . . . our decision-making, so that 
every child in this district receives the 
educational skills to be all he/she can be. We 
ask these things and all others in the name of 
Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen. 
 
Id. at 547 (ellipsis in original).   
 
 As the District Court found, “[i]t is undisputed that 
some Board members choose to invoke the name „Jesus,‟ 
„Jesus Christ,‟ „Heavenly Father,‟ or „Lord our God‟ during 
their prayers.”  Id. at 530.  This is confirmed by testimony 
from the Board‟s members.  In his deposition, Bireley stated 
that, in the nearly thirty years he had been on the Board, he 
could not recall a time when three of the current Board 
Members regularly responsible for the prayer had given a 
prayer that failed to invoke the name of Jesus Christ.  
Similarly, Board Member Cohee, who sat on the board from 
1993 through approximately 2004 “testified that the 
„majority‟ of Board prayers have been „Christian‟” during his 
service.  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 541.  He 
acknowledged that during his time he could not recall a 
spoken prayer being given that did not refer to “[a] religious 
deity other than Jesus or the Christian God.”  JA 519. 
 
 At the time of the original litigation, the responsibility 
for reciting the prayer alternated between Board Members 
Reginald Helms, Nina Lou Bunting, Donald Hattier, and 
Donna Mitchell.  Helms testified that he was responsible for 
six of the prayers in the fifteen Board meetings held between 
July 2005 and October 16, 2006, and at all six meetings he 
20 
“pray[ed] in the name of Jesus Christ,” JA 780.  During her 
deposition, Bunting explained, “I could not give what I would 
call a non-sectarian prayer, because I would have to mention 
Jesus Christ in my prayer, and I would consider that a 
sectarian prayer.  So if I gave a prayer it would have to be 
sectarian and not non-sectarian.”  JA 469.  Dr. Hattier did not 
present any testimony of the type of prayer that he typically 
offers except to suggest that they are usually “historical.”  JA 
656. 
 
 The record contains two examples of “historical” 
prayers recited by Board Members.  At the public Board 
meeting that took place on March 22, 2005, Board Member 
Walls recited a prayer from a speech given by Martin Luther 
King: 
 
God does not judge us by the separate 
incidences or the separate mistakes that we 
make, but by the total bent of our lives.  In the 
final analysis, God knows that his children are 
weak and they are frail.  In the final analysis 
what God requires is that your heart is right.   
 
JA 364.  Board Member Walls followed this with a brief 
statement of the prayer‟s significance: 
 
As we gather here this evening, let us take these 
words to heart and put the best interests of the 
students, teachers, employees and residents of 
the Indian River School District ahead of our 
own.  Amen.  
 
21 
JA 364.  On August 24, 2004, at the heated public meeting 
about the role of prayer in the District‟s schools, Board 
Member Hattier recited a historical prayer described by the 
District Court as a “prayer composed by George Washington 
and contained in a 1783 letter to the Governors of the newly-
freed states.”  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
 
 While the Policy permits moments of silence to be 
offered in place of a spoken prayer, this appears to happen 
infrequently.  In the thirty-six Board meetings held between 
October 2004 to October 2007, “[three] opened with a 




 Tasked with deciding the constitutionality of this 
Policy, the District Court was first obliged to tackle the 
threshold question of what legal framework to employ.  The 
parties presented two possibilities.  Defendants argued that 
the Indian River School  Board‟s Policy was constitutional 
under the legislative prayer exception set forth in Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), while plaintiffs maintained 
that the Supreme Court‟s school prayer jurisprudence 
provided a more suitable framework, citing specifically to 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).  Several elements 
of the School Board‟s actions took it outside the purview of 
Marsh, plaintiffs argued:  the attendance and participation of 
children in the Indian River School Board meetings, the 
Board‟s essential role in public school education, the Board‟s 
history of promoting sectarian prayer, and Marsh‟s unique 
historical context.  Plaintiffs‟ argument would have required 
the District Court to forego the special allowance for 
legislative bodies and examine the constitutionality of the 
22 
Policy under “other Establishment Clause tests-i.e., the 
Lemon test, the „endorsement‟ test or the „coercion‟ test.”  
Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 536. 
 
 Faced with these two choices, the District Court “ha[d] 
little trouble concluding that the School District qualified as 
the type of „deliberative body‟ contemplated by Marsh.”  685 
F. Supp. 2d at 537.  In concluding that the legislative prayer 
exception applied, the court cited the following facts:  (1) the 
Board is created by statute; (2) Board Members are popularly 
elected; (3) the Board‟s duties include “setting educational 
policies . . . hiring and firing administrators and teachers, 
creating and approving curriculum, administering the 
District‟s budget;” (4) the Board holds public meetings to 
vote on these issues; and (5) members of the community 
attend Board meetings to “express their views and concerns.”  
Id.  The District Court rejected plaintiffs‟ argument that 
because the Board lacked authority to pass laws or levy taxes 
without a public referendum, it was not a “legislative body.”  
Id.  The court explained that Marsh did not hinge on the 
“level of government in which a legislative or deliberative 
body falls or . . . the differences in the power and 
responsibilities such bodies exercise.”  Id.  In support, the 
court drew attention to cases where Marsh was applied 
beyond its traditional context, including a county 
commission, see Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 
1276 (11th Cir. 2008), county board of supervisors, see 
Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 
276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005), and a city council, see Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
 Plaintiffs also advanced the argument that Marsh was 
inapplicable because “public schools and public school 
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boards were „virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution 
was adopted.‟”  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 537 & n.107 
(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 
(1987)).  The District Court rejected that argument, noting 
that there was no support for the proposition that the prayer 
exception was limited to the types of legislative bodies in 
existence at the time that the First Amendment was adopted.  
Id. at 537-38. 
 
 The District Court next addressed plaintiffs‟ 
contention that the relationship between the public school 
system and school boards rendered Marsh inapplicable.  None 
of the features plaintiffs identified were particularly 
persuasive to the court.  First, school board meetings are not 
“akin to a classroom setting or a graduation ceremony.”  Id. at 
538-39.  In the former, “attendance is involuntary and 
students are under the exclusive control of school personnel.”  
Id. at 539.  A board meeting is also dissimilar from a school 
graduation, because graduations were “the one school event 
most important for the student to attend” and one where “the 
„influence and force‟ exercised over the students by the 
school personnel is „far greater.‟”  Id. at 539 (quoting Lee, 
505 U.S. at 591).  Second, board meetings are not analogous 
to school extracurricular activities, because the former are 
“part of a complete educational experience” and “important to 
many students.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Attending a board meeting, on the other hand, is “at best 
incidental to a student‟s public school experience.”  Id.  “In 
sum, a school board meeting does not implicate the same 
concerns as the coercive effect of classroom prayers, 
graduation prayers, or prayers during extracurricular 
activities.”  Id. 
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 In reaching this conclusion, the District Court 
distinguished the present case from the only other Court of 
Appeals decision to have tackled the question of whether a 
school board‟s prayer are subject to Marsh, Coles v. 
Cleveland Board of Education, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999).  
In Coles, the Sixth Circuit found in similar circumstances that 
school boards were distinct from legislative bodies, and thus 
board prayers should be analyzed under the school prayer 
case law, i.e. Lee, not Marsh. 171 F.3d at 379.  The District 
Court was not persuaded by the Sixth Circuit‟s reasoning:  “it 
strains credulity to equate a School Board meeting with a 
public school classroom” and “no Supreme Court precedent 
supports the proposition that the same concerns that apply in 
school settings . . . also apply in every „public school 
setting.‟”  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 539 n.120.  The 
court seized on Coles‟s reference to “public school settings,” 
which it warned could be used to invalidate prayer at “a 
teacher‟s conference in the evening or during the week,” a 
“PTA supper in the school gym,” or “any other activity 
conducted on school property.”  Id. (citing Coles, 171 F.3d at 
387 (Ryan, J. dissenting)). 
 
 Nor did the “frequent[] attend[ance]” of students at the 
board meetings or the fact that “students may feel disinclined 
to leave during an opening prayer” render Marsh inapplicable, 
the court explained.  Id. at 540.  The court acknowledged Jane 
Doe‟s testimony that she felt “peer pressure to bow her head” 
which made her “feel uncomfortable and excluded.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  While noting that it was 
“not insensitive to these concerns,” id., the court nonetheless 
dismissed them.  Other than Jane Doe‟s testimony, there was 
“no evidence [in the record] that any student has felt coerced 
or pressured to participate in a prayer given during a public 
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Board meeting.”  Id.  The court also drew attention to the 
perceived risk of finding that the presence of students at a 
legislative prayer invalidated the practice:  “[S]tudents across 
this country attend legislative sessions, including sessions of 
the United States Senate and House of Representatives, for 
similar purposes, including field trips, presentation of the 
colors, and to be recognized for their accomplishments.  If the 
mere presence of school children were enough to invalidate 
prayers in legislative and other deliberate bodies, such 
practices would be unconstitutional in virtually every 
setting.”  Id. 
 
 Having decided that Marsh applied, the District Court 
then tackled the question of whether the prayers were 
constitutional under that precedent.  It ultimately found that 
“Marsh did not intend to authorize only nonsectarian” prayer, 
and thus the content of the Board‟s prayers was not 
dispositive.  Id. at 541-42.  Nevertheless, the court took issue 
with the plaintiffs‟ characterization of the prayers as 
“overwhelmingly sectarian.”  Id. at 540-41.  At most, the 
court explained, “the Board Members often reference Jesus 
Christ in their prayer.”  Id.  Moreover, references to religious 
figures, including “God” and “Jesus Christ” do not 
necessarily render a prayer “sectarian,” because “[a]ny prayer 
has a religious component.”  Id. at 542 (internal quotation 
omitted).  The District Court also rejected plaintiffs‟ 
argument that the Prayer Policy was unconstitutional under 
Marsh because it “advances” Christianity and has been used 
to “proselytize.”  Id. at 543.  The court disagreed, explaining 
that “the brief references to Jesus Christ in [some of the] 
prayers” did not “transform those prayers into an 
impermissible attempt to proselytize or advance Christianity.”  
Id. at 544.  In addition, several features of the Policy ensured 
26 
the Board did not stray into constitutionally dubious territory:  
(1) the policy explicitly prohibits prayers that proselytize or 
advance Christianity; (2) the Policy explicitly permits non-
sectarian prayer; (3) responsibility for the prayer is rotated 
among Board Members; and (4) certain Board Members 
choose to lead a moment of silence rather than pray. 
 
 While recognizing the fact that the Board Members 
themselves had the responsibility of monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with the Prayer Policy was an “entanglement 
problem” that “would be cognizable” under the Supreme 
Court‟s school prayer jurisprudence, the District Court 
concluded that the Policy “d[id] not run afoul of Marsh.”  Id. 
at 544-45.  Similarly, the fact that the board members 
themselves gave the prayers did not render the Policy 
unconstitutional.  Citing to Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1233, the 
court noted that Marsh is not violated simply because the 
government “chooses [a] particular person” to give that 
prayer.  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 549.  Moreover, in 
this case, the Indian River Policy was even more inclusive 
than the practice in Marsh, because here the “unpaid, 
popularly elected members” rotated the prayer opportunity 
among themselves without regard to the Board Members‟ 
religious beliefs.  Id. at 549-50.  Finally, the District Court 
rejected plaintiffs‟ various arguments that the school board 
had an impermissible motive in adopting the Policy, finding 
that the evidence in the record did not support that assertion. 
 
 The District Court thus granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendants and denied plaintiffs‟ motion for 
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A.  The Establishment Clause 
 
 Our starting point, naturally, is the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.  The Establishment Clause 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”  Const. amend. I.  The 
Establishment Clause was “designed as a specific bulwark 
against [the] potential abuses of governmental power.”  Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104 (1968).  It therefore prohibits the 
government from “promot[ing] or affiliat[ing] itself with any 
religious doctrine or organization, . . . discriminat[ing] among 
persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, . . 
. delegat[ing] a governmental power to a religious institution,
 
and . . . involv[ing] itself too deeply in such an institution‟s 
affairs.”  Cnty of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989).  
The Clause “applies equally to the states, including public 
school systems, through the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 
175 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-
50 (1985)). 
 
                                                          
6
 We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final decision of 
the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District 




 The Supreme Court‟s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is vast and comprised of interlocking lines of 
cases applying the Clause in particular situations.  However, 
at the very least, the Court has ascribed to the First 
Amendment the following general meaning: 
 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away 
from church against his will or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for 
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, 
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of 
any religious organizations or groups and vice 
versa.  
 
Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 
(1947).  In the present case, we focus only on two lines of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence—the cases governing 
prayer in the public school system and the legislative prayer 
exception stated in Marsh. 
 
1.  The School Prayer Cases 
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 The Supreme Court first tackled the question of school 
prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  In that case, 
New York State implemented a regulation requiring school 
officials to recite a prayer aloud at the start of every day.  Id. 
at 423.  The prayer, which was composed by state officials, 
read in its entirety:  “Almighty God, we acknowledge our 
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, 
our parents, our teachers and our Country.”  Id. at 422.  The 
Supreme Court held that the practice of “using [the] public 
school system to encourage recitation of the Regents‟ prayer” 
was “wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.”  Id. 
at 424.  It reasoned that the prayer amounted to “religious 
activity” and served to “officially establish” the beliefs 
professed therein.  Id. 424, 430.  The Court warned that “it is 
no part of the business of government to compose official 
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a 
part of a religious program carried on by government.” Id. at 
425.  That the prayer was “nondenominational” or permitted 
students to remain silent or leave the classroom during the 
prayer did not cure its constitutional defects.  This is because 
the Establishment Clause is violated by “enactment of laws 
which establish an official religion whether those laws 
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.”  
Id. at 430. 
 
 The next year, in School District of Abington 
Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), 
the Supreme Court again invalidated two state policies of 
prayer in public schools:  a Pennsylvania law requiring “[a]t 
least ten verses from the Holy Bible [to] be read, without 
comment at the opening of each public school on each school 
day,” id. at 205, and a policy adopted by the Board of School 
Commissioners of Baltimore, Maryland, that called for every 
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school day to open with a reading “of a chapter in the Holy 
Bible and/or the use of the Lord‟s Prayer,” id. at 211.  In both 
cases, children could be excused from participating or 
observing the prayer.  Id. at 207, 211 n.4. 
 
 Neither practice withstood the Supreme Court‟s 
scrutiny.  Three aspects of the states‟ policies rendered them 
unconstitutional:  the fact that the state was “requiring the 
selection and reading at the opening of the school day of 
verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord‟s 
Prayer by the students in unison,” the fact that the practice 
was “prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students 
who are required by law to attend school,” and finally, that 
the prayer was recited “in the school buildings under the 
supervision and with the participation of teachers employed 
in those schools.”  Id. at 223.  Citing Engel, the Court 
explained that the fact that students could absent themselves 
from the prayer did not remedy the policy‟s 
unconstitutionality.  Id. at 225. 
 
 By the time the Court decided its next school prayer 
case, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), it had already 
announced the well-known “Lemon test” as the standard for 
determining the constitutionality of state action under the 
Establishment Clause.  In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court 
identified three factors that assist it in determining whether 
government action violates the Establishment Clause:  (1) 
whether the government practice had a secular purpose; (2) 
whether its principal or primary effect advanced or inhibited 
religion; and (3) whether it created an excessive entanglement 
of the government with religion.  403 U.S. 602, 612-13 
(1971).  Applying those factors, the Wallace Court held that 
an Alabama statute authorizing “a period of silence for 
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„meditation or voluntary prayer,‟” in public schools, 472 U.S. 
at 41, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the Supreme Court 
found that the statute failed the “purpose prong” of the 
Lemon test:  the evidence of legislative intent revealed that 
the explicit purpose of the statute was to return voluntary 
prayer to schools.  Id. 57-60. 
 
 The key case in this series—and the one plaintiffs 
primarily rely on—is Lee v. Weisman, supra.  In Lee, the 
Supreme Court held that a Rhode Island policy of permitting 
principals to choose clergymen to give nonsectarian prayers 
at school graduations was unconstitutional.  The Court 
identified several aspects of the state‟s control over the prayer 
that were constitutionally problematic:  First, because “[a] 
school official, the principal decided that an invocation and a 
benediction should be given; . . . . from a constitutional 
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers 
must occur.” 505 U.S. at 587.  Second, the principal chose 
who should give a prayer, a “choice [that] is also attributable 
to the State . . . [that has] the potential for divisiveness.”  Id.  
Third, because the principal provided the selected clergyman 
with guidelines for the prayer, the state “directed and 
controlled the content of the prayers.”  Id. at 588.  In effect, 
the government itself composed the prayer, a fact completely 
incompatible with the Establishment Clause.  Id.  Fourth, 
school officials‟ “effort to monitor prayer w[ould] be 
perceived by the students as inducing a participation they 
might otherwise reject.”  Id. at 590.  In sum, “[t]he degree of 
school involvement here made it clear that the graduation 
prayers bore the imprint of the State and thus put school-age 
children who objected in an untenable position.”  Id. 
 
32 
 The Lee Court wrote at length about the “heightened 
concerns,” regarding prayers in the public school educational 
system, which “carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.”  
Id. at 592.  Although that concern exists outside of the context 
of schools, “it is most pronounced there.”  Id.  Thus, courts 
must be careful to “protect[] freedom of conscience from 
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary 
public schools.”  Id.  In emphasizing the special nature of the 
school context, the Court compared the case to Marsh:  
“Inherent differences between the public school system and a 
session of a state legislature distinguish this case from [Marsh 
v. Chambers].”  Id. at 596.  First, “[t]he atmosphere at the 
opening of a session of a state legislature where adults are 
free to enter and leave with little comment and for any 
number of reasons cannot compare with the constraining 
potential of the one school event most important for the 
student to attend.”  Id. at 597.  Second, a school graduation 
has “far greater” “influence and force” than the “prayer 
exercise we condoned in Marsh.”  Id.  At a high school 
graduation, where school administrations “retain a high 
degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the 
speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the 
decorum of the students,” the school‟s involvement in the 
invocation and benediction “combine to make the prayer a 
state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was 
left with no alternative but to submit.”  Id.  This, too, 
distinguished Marsh from Lee. 
 
 The Court again rejected the argument that the prayer 
was constitutional because students had the choice to stand 
silently during the benediction or refuse to attend the 
graduation altogether.  Although the pressure to “stand as a 
group” during the invocation might be “subtle and indirect,” 
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it was “as real as any overt compulsion.”  Id. at 593.  The 
Court acknowledged that although standing silently might be 
interpreted as a personal act of dissent, the “reasonable 
perception” would be that any student standing or remaining 
silent during the prayer was participating in the prayer.  Id.  
In support, Lee drew from research showing that “adolescents 
are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards 
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of 
social convention.”  Id.  at 593-94. 
 
 Of course, a student could always choose to absent 
herself from the graduation ceremony altogether.  But this 
“choice” was no choice at all.  While the parties had 
stipulated that attendance at the graduation was “voluntary,” 
the Court disagreed with this characterization.  “[T]o say a 
teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school 
graduation is formalistic in the extreme.”  Id. at 595.  “Law 
reaches past formalism.”  Id.  Graduations have significant 
personal and cultural meaning; they are an opportunity for the 
student and her family to “celebrate success and express 
mutual wishes of gratitude and respect.”  Id.  To require a 
student to absent herself from her graduation in order to 
express her disapproval of the school prayer policy would 
contradict the First Amendment.  This is because “the State 
cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights 
and benefits as the price of resist[ance.]”  Id. at 596. 
 
 The “heightened concerns” attendant to students more 
recently led the Supreme Court to strike down school policies 
permitting prayer at events where attendance is even more 
“voluntary.”  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000).  In Santa Fe, the Court tackled the question of 
whether student-led and student-initiated invocations 
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authorized by school policy that were given prior to a football 
game violated the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 294.  Under 
that policy, the senior class elected the students responsible 
for delivering a “brief invocation and/or message,” the 
purpose of which was to “solemnize” the “home varsity 
football games.”  Id. at 296-97 & n.6. 
 
 With the principles of Lee in mind, id. at 301-02, the 
Court found that, despite student involvement in selecting and 
composing the invocation, the state was in fact extensively 
“entangled” in this religious activity, id. at 305-08.  The 
school had crafted the policy permitting student prayer and 
thus was responsible for selection of the speakers and their 
messages; the prayer was delivered “as part of a regularly 
scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school 
property” and “the message [wa]s broadcast over the school‟s 
public address system, which remain[ed] subject to the 
control of school officials” and the prayers took place at 
football games replete with school symbols.  Id. at 307. 
 
 The Supreme Court also rejected the school‟s 
argument that Lee‟s warnings about the coercive aspects of 
school graduations were absent in extracurricular events like 
football games.  While accepting the proposition that 
attendance at a football game was in some ways more 
voluntary than attendance at a high school graduation, the 
Court noted that for some students—the players, cheerleaders, 
band members—attendance was essentially mandatory.  For 
others, football games were important “traditional 
gatherings.”  Id. at 312.  Citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 596, Justice 
Stevens reiterated that the First Amendment does not permit 
the school to “force” students to make the “difficult choice” 
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between “attending these games and avoiding personally 
offensive religious rituals.”  530 U.S. at 312. 
 
2.  The Legislative Prayer Exception in Marsh 
 
 In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the 
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the 
Nebraska legislature‟s practice of opening each session with a 
prayer given by a chaplain who was paid with public funds.  
Marsh is atypical within the Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence in that the Supreme Court did not employ its 
usual Establishment Clause “tests” to analyze the contested 
state practice.  Rather, the Court‟s decision, which found that 
the practice was constitutional, is premised on the long 
history of prayer by legislative and deliberative bodies in the 
United States. 
 
 Writing for the Court, Justice Burger set forth that 
history: 
 
The opening of sessions of legislative and other 
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply 
embedded in the history and tradition of this 
country. From colonial times through the 
founding of the Republic and ever since, the 
practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with 
the principles of disestablishment and religious 
freedom. . . . 
 
The tradition in many of the colonies was, of 
course, linked to an established church, but the 
Continental Congress, beginning in 1774, 
adopted the traditional procedure of opening its 
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sessions with a prayer offered by a paid 
chaplain.   
 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787 (internal citations omitted).  Marsh 
paid particular attention to the timing of the enactment of the 
Bill of Rights, which played a pivotal role in the Court‟s 
reasoning.  The Court observed that while “prayers were not 
offered during the Constitutional Convention, the First 
Congress, as one of its early items of business, adopted the 
policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session with 
prayer.”  Id. at 787-88.  This led the Senate to create a 
committee to appoint a suitable chaplain on April 7, 1789.  Id. 
at 788.  On April 9, 1789, the House of Representatives 
created a similar committee.  Id.  The Senate elected its first 
chaplain on April 25, 1789, while the House did the same a 
few days later on May 1, 1789.  Id.  On September 22, 1789, 
a statute providing for the payment of these chaplains was 
enacted.  Id.  A mere three days after Congress authorized 
payment for the chaplains, “final agreement was reached on 
the language of the Bill of Rights.”  Id. 
 
 The Supreme Court ascribed to this chronology great 
significance, explaining that this series of events “shed[] light 
. . . on how [the draftsmen] thought that [the Establishment] 
Clause applied to the practice” of legislative prayer.  Id. at 
790.  The fact that the First Amendment was written only 
days after the Senate had authorized payment for the 
chaplains suggested to the Court that legislative prayer did 
not offend the First Amendment.  The history was evidence of 
the following: 
 
Clearly, the men who wrote the First 
Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid 
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legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a 
violation of that Amendment, for the practice of 
opening sessions with prayer has continued 
without interruption ever since that early 
session of congress. 
 . . .  
It can hardly be thought that in the same week 
Members of the First Congress voted to appoint 
and to pay a Chaplain for each House and also 
voted to approve the draft of the First 
Amendment for submission to the States, they 
intended the Establishment Clause of the 
Amendment to forbid what they had just 
declared acceptable. 
 
Id. at 788, 790.  Given this “unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years” of Congressional prayer, the 
Court explained, “there can be no doubt that the practice of 
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of 
the fabric of our society.”  Id. at 792.  Nebraska‟s century-old 
practice of legislative prayer was “consistent with two 
centuries of national practice” and thus would not “be cast 
aside.”  Id. at 790.  However, the Court did not define a 
“legislative” or “deliberative” body anywhere in its opinion. 
 
 The second issue in Marsh was whether the specific 
prayers offered by the Nebraska Legislature violated the 
Establishment Clause.  The Court found that they did not, 
again drawing from the history of legislative prayer in the 
First Congress.  The Court identified three potentially 
problematic aspects of the Nebraskan prayer practice:  (1) the 
prayers were given by “a clergyman of only one 
denomination-Presbyterian-[who] has been selected for 16 
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years;” (2) “the chaplain is paid at public expense;” and (3) 
“the prayers are in the Judeo-Christian tradition.”  Id. at 793. 
 
 None of these factors, considered against the “unique 
history” of legislative prayers, rendered the Nebraska practice 
unconstitutional.  Id.  Again, the Court explained that at the 
First Congress, “delegates did not consider opening prayers as 
a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the 
government‟s official seal of approval on one religious view.”  
Id. at 792 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Moreover, there was no evidence that the chaplain‟s long 
tenure “stemmed from an impermissible motive” and thus his 
reappointment did “not in itself conflict with the 
Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 793-94.  That the chaplain was 
paid from public funds was similarly “grounded in historic 
practice” and thus not unconstitutional.  Id. at 794.  The 
content of the prayer was “not of concern” because “there is 
no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, 
faith or belief.”  Id. at 794-95.  In sum, the prayers were 
“simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country.”  Id. at 792. 
 
B.  Application to the Indian River School Board 
 
 In light of this jurisprudential background, we must 
determine whether our analysis of the Indian River School 
Board‟s Prayer Policy is guided by the principles endorsed in 
Lee v. Weisman or by the exception established in Marsh v. 
Chambers.  For the reasons below, we conclude that Marsh‟s 
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legislative prayer exception does not apply and find that Lee 




 Lee and the Supreme Court‟s other school prayer cases 
reveal that the need to protect students from government 
coercion in the form of endorsed or sponsored religion is at 
the heart of the school prayer cases.  This reflects the 
fundamental guarantee of the First Amendment that 
“government may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in religion or its exercise.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.  The risk of 
coercion is heightened in the public school context:  “prayer 
exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect 
coercion.”  Id.  The possibility of coercion is greater in 
schools because children are more “susceptible to pressure 
from their peers.”  Id. at 593; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (“Students in [elementary and 
secondary schools] are impressionable . . . . The State exerts 
great authority and coercive power . . . because of . . . the 
                                                          
7
 We review a district court‟s grant of summary judgment de 
novo.  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).  
In doing so, we apply the same standard as the district court.  
Id.  That is, summary judgment should be granted “if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In deciding whether 
summary judgment is warranted, we “must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party‟s favor.”  Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 
South Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist.,  587 F.3d 597, 603 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citing Norfolk S. Ry. v. Basell USA, Inc., 512 
F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
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children‟s susceptibility to peer pressure.”).  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has “recognized a distinction when 
government-sponsored religious exercises are directed at 
impressionable children who are required to attend school, for 
then government endorsement is much more likely to result in 
coerced religious beliefs.”  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 81 
(O‟Connor, J., concurring). 
 
 Marsh does not adequately capture these concerns.  
The Indian River School Board carries out its practice of 
praying in an atmosphere that contains many of the same 
indicia of coercion and involuntariness that the Supreme 
Court has recognized elsewhere in its school prayer 
jurisprudence.  While there is no doubt that school board 
meetings do not necessarily hold the same type of personal 
and cultural significance as a high school graduation or 
perhaps even a football game, we take to heart the Supreme 
Court‟s observation that, in this respect, “[l]aw reaches past 
formalism.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.  In Lee, although the 
parties stipulated that attendance at the graduation was 
“voluntary,” the Court rejected that characterization: 
 
Attendance may not be required by official 
decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not 
free to absent herself from the graduation 
exercise in any real sense of the term 
“voluntary,” for absence would require 
forfeiture of those intangible benefits which 
have motivated the student through youth and 
all her high school years. Graduation is a time 
for family and those closest to the student to 
celebrate success and express mutual wishes of 
gratitude and respect, all to the end of 
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impressing upon the young person the role that 
it is his or her right and duty to assume in the 
community and all of its diverse parts. 
 
505 U.S. at 595. 
 
 In Santa Fe, the school district also argued that 
attendance at a high school game was distinguishable from 
the “involuntary” nature of graduation exercises that Lee 
recognized.  530 U.S. at 311.  The Supreme Court agreed that 
“[a]ttendance at a high school football game . . . is certainly 
not required in order to receive a diploma,” but rejected the 
formalism inherent in the district‟s argument.  Id.  For certain 
students, namely the “cheerleaders, members of the band, and 
of course, the team members themselves,” attendance at the 
football game is mandatory as part of their “seasonal 
commitment.”  Id.  The Supreme Court cautioned against 
“minimiz[ing] the importance . . . of attending and 
participating in extracurricular activities as part of a complete 
educational experience.”  Id.  Of course, some students may 
choose not to attend the games.  However, for a second group 
of students—those who have no formal role at the football 
games—the event still is nonetheless a meaningful one and 
“the choice between attending these games and avoiding 
personally offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense 
an easy one.”  Id. at 312. 
 
 The Indian River Board meetings are akin to those 
events.  It is true that attendance at the Indian River School 
Board meetings is not technically mandatory.  Nevertheless, 
the meetings bear several markings of “involuntariness” and 




 First, like graduations, the Board‟s recognition of 
student achievement allows “family and those closest to the 
student to celebrate success.”  Id.  For years, the Indian River 
School Board has used its regular meeting to recognize 
student accomplishment of various types.  These are awards 
that were previously given out at student assemblies, but the 
Board deliberately decided to change the location of the 
awards to its meetings.  This change had the effect of 
ensuring student attendance at nearly all the Board meetings 
that take place during the school year.  Over the years, 
hundreds of individual students and students groups have 
attended a Board meeting in order to be recognized for their 
academic, athletic, or artistic skills and achievements. Their 
families are asked to join them in the celebration.  At the 
meeting, the student‟s name is called and they are presented 
with a letter commemorating the experience. The award is 
reflected in the minutes and may be published in the local 
newspaper.  Thus, by virtue of the way in which it gives out 
these awards, the Board does more than casually celebrate 
student accomplishments; it effectively cloaks them in official 
recognition. 
 
 Therefore, like commencement exercises, a student 
who decides not to attend the meeting will “forfeit . . . 
intangible benefits” that “have motivated the student.”  Lee, 
505 U.S. at 595.  They will be giving up an opportunity to 
“celebrate success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and 
respect.”  Id.  Of course, attendance at a meeting of the Board 
does not bear all of the same hallmarks of personal and 
cultural significance that a high school graduation ceremony 
does.  It may not be “one of life‟s most significant occasions.”  
Id. at 595.  It may not be as exciting an event as a football 
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game.  But the Indian River School Board has deliberately 
made its meetings meaningful to students in the district.  The 
significance of the awards portion of the meeting is borne out 
by Bireley‟s testimony.  Bireley testified that it was an “honor 
for [the students] to come to receive an award” at the 
meetings.  JA 393.  These awards are such an important part 
of student life that Bireley was not aware of any instance 
where a student declined to attend the meeting to receive an 
award, other than for a scheduling conflict. 
 
 Thus, for these students, the meetings are a 
culmination of their extracurricular activities.
8
  This has 
additional implications for awards given out to teams.  In 
situations where entire teams are honored, a student may feel 
especially coerced to attend a meeting where the Board 
recites a prayer.  A student may feel pressure to attend the 
meeting with their team; to do otherwise could be construed 
as abandoning the team.  At the very least, a team member 
who absents herself will not receive the same tangible and 
intangible benefits as her teammates. 
                                                          
8
 For example, the Board “recognized and presented 
certificates” to the following individuals and teams “for their 
accomplishments” at the April 26, 2005 meeting:  28 students 
belonging to the 2005 Odyssey of the Mind Team; four 
members of the JROTC State Champion Shooting Team and 
three members of the JROTC State Champion Color Guard of 
the Indian River High School; two state wrestling champions 
from Indian River High School, two students who won first 
place at the “Science Olympiad;” four students who won first 
place at a Future Farmers of America competition; and ten 
members of the Academic All-State Wrestling Team from the 
Indian River High School. 
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 In this context, the Supreme Court‟s observation that 
students are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure in social 
context is an important one.  Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311-12 
(“We stressed in Lee the obvious observation that adolescents 
are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards 
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of 
social convention.”) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  Given this pressure, we question whether an 
individual team member will feel free to choose not to attend 
the meeting in order to avoid participating in the prayer when 
the rest of the team is being honored at the meeting.  The 
existence of such pressure is borne out by a critical fact in the 
record:  students have never decided not to attend the 
meetings, other than for a scheduling conflict. 
 
 Moreover, for at least some students, attendance at the 
Board meetings is more formally part of their extracurricular 
activities, and thus is closer to compulsory.  JROTC members 
are one example.  Every Board meeting begins with a 
“presentation of the colors” of the high school where the 
Board meeting is taking place.  There are only two such 
JROTC programs, and thus the students in the JROTC must 
attend the meetings. 
 
 Attendance also borders on compulsory for student 
government representatives. Student government members 
are invited to the Board meetings in their official capacity as 
representatives of the two local high schools.  Their 
presentations to the Board are a specific part of the Board‟s 
agenda.  The record confirms that student government leaders 
routinely attend the meetings and speak on a wide variety of 
issues relating to the student experience in the Indian River 
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School District.  Thus, they directly represent student 
interests at the Board‟s meeting.  The meeting gives student 
government representatives—and therefore all the students—
an opportunity to draw attention to issues that affect their 
educational experience.  As befits their role, student 
representatives may speak on a number of different issues.  
An example from the minutes illustrates the nature of these 
presentations.  At the March 22, 2005 Board meeting, a 
student representing Sussex Central Student Council gave a 
lengthy presentation identifying the issues affecting the 
student body, including students‟ reactions to the new school 
lunch menu, the themes and locations of the school‟s 
upcoming prom, the result of efforts to raise funds for disaster 
relief, problems with the athletic fields, accomplishments at 
various athletic competitions, efforts by the guidance office to 
assist with college applications, and the administration of 
state educational exams. 
 
 To say that the attendance of student government 
representatives is not part of their extracurricular obligations 
is to undermine the contributions these students make to their 
school and their communities.  In this regard, they are more 
like the “cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of course, 
the team members themselves, for whom seasonal 
commitments mandate their attendance” at football games.  




                                                          
9
 For these reasons, we also disagree with the District Court‟s 
conclusion that school board meetings are unlike 
extracurricular activities because they are not “important” or 
“part of a complete educational experience.” 
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 The Board argues that its meetings are distinguishable 
from graduations because “audience members, including 
students, may freely enter and exit—and they do.  If 
Appellants or anyone else finds it truly intolerable to hear a 
brief prayer they can easily absent themselves for that short 
portion of the meeting.”  Appellee Br. 29.  They point out 
that, under Lee, “the ability to come and go freely without 
notice or interference is highly relevant to the inquiry.”  Id. 
 
 Appellees misunderstand the lesson in Lee.  Simply 
put, giving a student the option to leave a prayer “is not a cure 
for a constitutional violation.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 596; see also 
Engel, 370 U.S. at 425; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.  “It is a 
tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require 
one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as 
the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious 
practice.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 596.  The First Amendment does 
not allow the state to force this kind of choice upon a student.  
 
 Additional contextual elements of the Board meetings 
betray the possibility that students will feel coerced into 
participating in the prayer practice.  The meetings take place 
on school property.  The Board retains complete control over 
the meeting; it sets the agenda and the schedule, for example.  
Cf. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (“At a high school graduation, 
teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree of 
control over the precise contents of the program, the 
speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the 
decorum of the students.”).  It is in this context that the Board 
itself composes and recites the prayer.  Thus, the Board is 
involved in every aspect of the prayer.  In these 
circumstances, it is particularly difficult to imagine that a 
student would not feel pressure to participate in the practice, 
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or at least appear to agree with it—particularly a student 
appearing in front of the Board to contest a disciplinary 
action. 
 
 Second, regardless of whether the Board is a 
“deliberative or legislative body,” we conclude that Marsh is 
ill-suited to this context because the entire purpose and 
structure of the Indian River School Board revolves around 
public school education.  The District Court‟s starting 
position was that Marsh applied because the School Board 
was a “legislative body.”  We find this analysis unpersuasive.  
To conclude that, merely because the Board has duties and 
powers similar to a legislative body Marsh applies, is to 
ignore the Board‟s role in Delaware‟s system of public school 
education. 
 
 Every aspect of the Indian River School Board is 
intended to promote and support the public school system.  
By statute, the Board‟s purpose is to “administer and to 
supervise the free public schools of the . . . school district” 
and “determine policy and adopt rules and regulations for the 
general administration and supervision” of the schools.  14 
Del. C. § 1043.  All of the Board‟s policy making 
responsibilities are aimed at educating students or otherwise 
administering the public school system.  For example, the 
Board determines the number of hours in a school day, 
enforces school attendance, evaluates schools within the 
District, decides whether to establish kindergartens, sets the 
“educational policies” of the school, “adopt[s] courses of 
study; purchases textbooks and other equipment,” and 
“appoint[s] personnel.”  14 Del. C. § 1049.  More generally, 
the Board also has the responsibility of “prescrib[ing] rules 
and regulations for the conduct and management of the 
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schools.”  Id. at § 1049(2).  Even the power to levy taxes—
which the Board points out is a hallmark of a legislative 
body—is limited to “school purposes.”  Id. at § 1902. 
 
 The Board‟s responsibilities serve to further highlight 
the compulsory nature of student attendance at Board 
meetings.  A student wishing to comment on school policies 
or otherwise participate in the decision-making that affects 
his or her education must attend these meetings.  Thus, while 
such meetings may technically be “voluntary,” in practice 
they are not.  The First Amendment does not require students 
to give up their right to participate in their educational system 
or be rewarded for their school-related achievements as a 
price for dissenting from a state-sponsored religious practice.  
Lee, 505 U.S. at 593-94 (recognizing that, for elementary and 
secondary school students, the government cannot force one 
to choose between appearing to participate in state-sponsored 
religious practice or protesting).  As the presence of hundreds 
of students, parents, teachers, and community members at the 
Board‟s contentious August 24, 2004 meeting makes plain, 
Board meetings are the site of community discussion about 
school policies and events. 
 
 In this respect, we find the Sixth Circuit‟s discussion 
of the role of school boards instructive.  In Coles v. Cleveland 
Board of Education, 171 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1999), the 
Court of Appeals confronted the same question we have 
before us:  “Are the prayers in question more like „school 
prayers‟ prohibited by Lee or closer to „legislative prayer‟ 
permitted by Marsh?”  The Sixth Circuit held that the purpose 
and nature of the school board “remove[d] it from the logic in 
Marsh and . . . place[d] it squarely within the history and 
precedent concerning the school prayer line of cases.”  Id. at 
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381.  The court identified several features of the school 
board‟s structure that distinguished it from a traditional 
legislative body: 
 
Although the school board, like many other 
legislative bodies, is composed of publicly 
elected officials drawn from the local 
community, that is where the similarity ends. . . 
. Simply stated, the fact that the function of the 
school board is uniquely directed toward 
school-related matters gives it a different type 
of “constituency” than those of other legislative 
bodies-namely, students. Unlike ordinary 
constituencies, students cannot vote. They are 
thus unable to express their discomfort with 
state-sponsored religious practices through the 
democratic process. Lacking a voice in the 
electoral process, students have a heightened 
interest in expressing their views about the 
school system through their participation in 
school board meetings. . . . . 
 
[U]nlike officials of other legislative bodies, 
school board members are directly 
communicating, at least in part, to students. 
They are setting policies and standards for the 
education of children within the public school 
system, a system designed to foster democratic 
values in the nation‟s youth, not to exacerbate 
and amplify differences between them. . . .  
 
Meetings of the board serve as a forum for 
students to petition school officials on issues 
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affecting their education. Simply put, students 
do not sit idly by as the board discusses various 
school-related issues. School board meetings 
are therefore not the equivalent of galleries in a 
legislature where spectators are incidental to the 
work of the public body; students are directly 
involved in the discussion and debate at school 
board meetings. 
  
Id. at 381-82. 
 
 We agree with the Sixth Circuit‟s analysis.  The very 
purpose of the Indian River School Board distinguishes it 
from other deliberative bodies.  For this reason, the fact that 
other courts have extended Marsh to other legislative or 
deliberative bodies is not relevant.  See Pelphrey v. Cobb 
Cnty., 547 F.3d at 1276 (county commission meetings); 
Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 
276, 281 (4th Cir. 2005) (county board of supervisors); 
Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1228 (city council).
10
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 Other Courts of Appeals have also been cautious in 
extending Marsh beyond legislative sessions.  See, e.g., 
Coles, 171 F.3d at 381 (“As far as Marsh is concerned, there 
are no subsequent Supreme Court cases. Marsh is one-of-a-
kind.”); Mellen v. Buntin, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(refusing to apply Marsh to daily “supper prayer” at state-
operated military college because “Marsh is applicable only 
in narrow circumstances” and supper prayer at the military 
institute “does not share Marsh‟s „unique history.‟”; Warner 
v. Orange Cnty. Dep‟t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 
1997) (expressing reluctance to apply Marsh to inmate‟s 
compulsory participation in Alcoholics Anonymous program 
51 
 
 We begin by noting that the District Court‟s reasoning 
ignores Marsh‟s suggestion that the presence of children 
would affect its calculus.  In its historical analysis of 
legislative prayer, the Marsh Court cited to several statements 
and letters from the Founding Fathers, concluding that this 
“interchange emphasizes that the delegates did not consider 
opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically 
placing the government‟s official seal of approval on one 
religious view.”  463 U.S. at 792 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  Yet the Court expressed a note of 
caution:  “Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice 
is an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to religious 
indoctrination, or peer pressure.”  Id. (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 
 Moreover, although the Marsh Court referenced 
“other” deliberative bodies, Marsh‟s entire approach rests on 
the long-standing and “unique” history of legislative prayer.  
There may be some truth to the District Court‟s conclusion 
that, “nothing in Marsh . . . suggests that the Court intended 
to limit its approval of prayer . . . to those [legislative and 
deliberative bodies] that were in existence when the First 
Amendment was adopted.”  Id. at 537-38.  However, at least 
one Supreme Court decision after Marsh suggests that 
Marsh‟s analysis is not suitable to public schools.  In Edwards 
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), the Court addressed the 
question of whether Louisiana‟s “Creationism Act,” which 
forbade the teaching of the theory of evolution in public 
elementary and secondary schools unless accompanied by 
                                                                                                                                  
because Marsh “relied heavily on the long tradition of public 
prayer in the [legislative context]”). 
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instruction in the theory of “creation science,” violated the 
Establishment Clause.  Id. at 581-82.  Explaining that the 
appropriate legal test was Lemon, the Court warned that 
Marsh‟s historical approach “is not useful in determining the 
proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free 
public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the 
Constitution was adopted.”  Id. 
 
 We find additional support in the Supreme Court‟s 
subsequent treatment of Marsh.  The Court has consistently 
emphasized the narrow, historical underpinnings of Marsh 
and has proven reluctant to extend Marsh outside of its 
narrow historical context.  See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844, 860 n.10 (2005) 
(describing Marsh as a “special instance[]”); Allegheny, 492 
U.S. at 603-05 (1989) (while Marsh recognized a “unique 
history” of legislative prayer, it “plainly does not stand for the 
sweeping proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years 
old and their equivalents are constitutional today”); Wallace, 
472 U.S. at 63 & n.5 (explaining that since Lemon was 
adopted, only Marsh has been decided “without resort to [the] 
three-pronged test” and Marsh was “based primarily on . . . 
long historical practice”) (Powell, J., concurring).  Only one 
Supreme Court case has drawn extensively on Marsh‟s 
historical analysis, and, even in that case, the Court ultimately 
applied the Lemon test to determine that a city‟s display of 
the nativity scene violated the Establishment Clause.  See 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984). 
 
 Appellees argue that “to suggest that Board prayer 
becomes unconstitutional simply because a handful of 
students . . . attend a monthly meeting where a sixty-second 
prayer is offered, is absurd.”  Appellee Br. 31.  This 
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overstatement does not reflect our holding.
11
  The “mere 
presence” of students at a legislative session is not what 
makes the Indian River policy unconstitutional.  Our decision 
is premised on careful consideration of the role of students at 
school boards, the purpose of the school board, and the 
principles underlying the Supreme Court‟s school prayer case 
law.  It does not endanger the centuries-long practice of 
prayer at legislative sessions.
12
  We are tasked with 
“protect[ing] freedom of conscience from subtle coercive 
pressure in the elementary and public schools.”  Lee, 505 
U.S. at 592.  In the public school context, the need to protect 
students from coercion is of the utmost importance. 
 
 In sum, because we find that the type of potentially 
coercive atmosphere the Supreme Court asks us to guard 
against is present here, because of the nature of the 
relationship between the Board and Indian River students and 
schools, and in light of Marsh‟s narrow historical context, we 
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 Moreover, we question whether the length of the prayer 
would even be a relevant consideration.  See Engel, 370 U.S. 
at 436 (fact that 22-second prayer was “brief” or “general” 
did not render it constitutional); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. 
at 225 (“[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices 




 For the same reason, we reject the District Court‟s 
conclusion that, if “the mere presence of school children were 
enough to invalidate prayers in legislative and other 
deliberative bodies,” then the practice of prayer “would be 
unconstitutional in virtually every setting.” 
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hold that the District Court erred in applying the legislative 




A.  The Establishment Clause Tests 
 
 Having decided that this case is controlled by the 
principles in Lee v. Weisman, we must next decide whether 
the Indian River Policy violates the Establishment Clause.
13
  
In this regard, we confront another threshold question—what 
Establishment Clause “test” to apply.  In the public school 
context, the Supreme Court has been inclined to apply the 
Lemon test.  See Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 383 (1985) (noting that the Court has “particularly relied 
on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship 
between government and religion in the education of our 
children”).  However, we note that Lemon has “been the 
subject of critical debate in recent years.”  Am. Civil Liberties 
Union of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Reg‟l Bd. of Educ., 
84 F.3d 1471, 1484 (3d Cir. 1996).  “[I]ts continuing vitality 
has been called into question by members of the Supreme 
Court and by its noticeable absence from the analysis in some 
of the Court‟s recent decisions.”  Id.; see also Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (describing Supreme Court‟s 
reluctance to apply Lemon).  Under Lemon, a three-part 
inquiry determines whether a challenged government action is 
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 In the District Court, both parties moved for summary 
judgment.  On appeal, there are no disputed issues of material 
fact and the parties briefed the constitutionality of the Policy 
under Lemon.  Therefore, we find it appropriate to address 
the merits of this issue. 
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constitutional under the Establishment Clause:  “(1) whether 
the government practice had a secular purpose; (2) whether its 
principal or primary effect advanced or inhibited religion; and 
(3) whether it created an excessive entanglement of the 
government with religion.”  403 U.S. at 612-13. 
 
 The “endorsement test” advocated by Justice 
O‟Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668 (1984), has emerged as an alternative.  Under the 
endorsement test, “[w]hat is crucial is that a government 
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”  Lynch, 
465 U.S. at 692 (O‟Connor, J., concurring).  This analysis 
adopts the viewpoint of a “reasonable observer familiar with 
the history and context of the display” and asks whether they 
“would perceive the display as a government endorsement of 
religion.” Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. East Brunswick, 523 
F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Modrovich v. Allegheny 
Cnty., Pa., 385 F.3d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 2004)).  The Supreme 
Court applied the “endorsement test” in its most recent school 
prayer case.  Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.  The endorsement test 
and the second Lemon prong are essentially the same.  Black 
Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1486 (“Whether „the endorsement test‟ 
is part of the inquiry under Lemon or a separate inquiry apart 
from it, the import of the test is the same.”); see also 
Freethought Soc. of Greater Philadelphia v. Chester Cnty., 
334 F.3d 247, 269 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing “effect” prong 
of Lemon as a “cognate to endorsement”). 
 
 This Court has applied both tests.  See Busch v. 
Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 100-01 (3d Cir. 
2009) (applying Lemon); Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 (applying 
endorsement test); Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1484 
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(applying Lemon but noting that it had been “the subject of 
critical debate in recent years”).  Because Lemon has not been 
overruled, we will apply it here.  However, as we have done 
elsewhere, “[i]n light of the critique of the Lemon test,” we 
will “also consider [the] claim that the [Board‟s Policy] fails 
the „endorsement test.‟”  Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., South 
Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist.,  587 F.3d 597, 603 (3d Cir. 
2009); see also Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 406 (“we will apply 
both the endorsement test and the Lemon test, in case a higher 
court prefers to apply the traditional Lemon test”).  
 
B.  The Lemon Test
14
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 We find it useful to begin by commenting on one aspect of 
the District Court‟s application of Marsh to the present case.  
The District Court acknowledged that Doe felt “pressured” to 
participate in the Board‟s prayer by bowing her head but  
“nonetheless conclude[d] that” plaintiff‟s testimony “d[id] not 
render the Board‟s Prayer Policy unconstitutional.”  685 F. 
Supp.2d at 594.  The Court also stated that “[p]laintiffs have 
offered no evidence that any student has felt coerced or 
pressured to participate in a prayer given during a public 
Board meeting.”  685 F. Supp.2d at 594.  We disagree with 
this analysis.  Plaintiff Doe clearly claimed that she felt 
coerced into participating in the prayer.  Therefore, the court 
erred in relying on the absence of additional evidence of 
injury to find the Board Prayer Policy constitutional.  There is 
no “de minimis” defense to a First Amendment violation.  
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374 (1976) (“The loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); see also 
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (“[I]t is no defense to urge that the 
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 Proceeding under Lemon, “the challenged action is 
unconstitutional if (1) it lacks a secular purpose, (2) its 
primary effect is to either advance or inhibit religion, or (3) it 
fosters an excessive entanglement of government with 
religion.  Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 401 (citing Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 612-13). 
 
1.  The Secular Purpose Prong 
 
 “In applying the purpose [prong],” we ask “whether 
government‟s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion.”  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (internal quotations marks 
omitted).  Under Lemon, if the statute has some secular 
purpose, then it survives the first prong.  Freethought, 334 
F.3d at 262 (“[T]he purpose prong of Lemon only requires 
some secular purpose, and not that the purposes . . . are 
exclusively secular.”) (quotations omitted).  The stated 
secular purpose, however, must be sincere and not a mere 
sham.  Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586. 
 
 The Board argues that the purpose of the Prayer Policy 
is to “solemnify” its meetings, and thus that the Government 
has a secular purpose in promoting prayer.  We will not take 
issue with the appellees‟ characterization of their policy, 
which we note is “entitled to some deference.”  Santa Fe, 530 
U.S. at 308.  However, even assuming the Board‟s primary 
purpose is to solemnify the meetings, we nonetheless hold 
that the Policy violates the Establishment Clause because, as 
                                                                                                                                  
religious practices here may be relatively minor 
encroachments on the First Amendment.”).  
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we determine below, its primary effect is to advance religion 
and it fosters excessive government entanglement in religion.  
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (“If a statute 
violates any of these three principles [of Lemon], it must be 
struck down under the Establishment Clause.”). 
 
2.  The Primary Effect Prong 
 
 Under the second prong of Lemon, a state‟s practice 
“can neither advance, nor inhibit religion.”  Black Horse Pike, 
84 F.3d at 1486.  This means that “regardless of its purpose,” 
the government practice “cannot symbolically endorse or 
disapprove of religion.”  Busch, 567 F.3d at 100.  As 
explained earlier, the second prong of Lemon is akin, if not 
identical, to the endorsement test.
 15
  Black Horse Pike, 84 
F.3d at 1486.  This Court “must determine whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the challenged practice conveys 
a message favoring or disfavoring religion.”  Id.  In doing so, 
we adopt the viewpoint of the reasonable observer and may 
take into account “the „history and ubiquity‟ of [the] 
practice,” since it “„provides part of the context in which a 
reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged 
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of 
religion.‟”  Id. (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 
473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)). 
 
 Appellees concede that the Prayer Policy has “the 
incidental effect of advancing religion.” Appellee Br. 52.  
                                                          
15
 For that reason, cases discussing both are useful.  See, e.g., 
Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 606 (using case law and language 
describing the endorsement test to set forth the “effect prong” 
of the Lemon test).  
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They argue nonetheless that there is “no evidence from which 
a reasonable observer could conclude that advancing religion 
is the prayer policy‟s primary effect.”  Rather, the primary 
purpose of the Policy is to solemnify the Board‟s 
proceedings.  For the two reasons that follow, we find that the 
Policy impermissibly endorses religion. 
 
 First, the largely religious content of the prayers would 
suggest to a reasonable person that the primary effect of the 
Policy is to promote Christianity.  Of course, by its very 
terms, the Policy permits references to any religious figure 
and allows non-sectarian prayer.  As discussed earlier, the 
majority of the prayers delivered by the Board are—by the 
Board Members‟ own admission—sectarian.  Only 
occasionally have Board Members used this opportunity to 
propose a moment of silence. These prayers therefore 
constitute “religious activity.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 603 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In the words of Engel, the 
Rabbi‟s prayer „is a solemn avowal of divine faith and 
supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. The nature of 
such a prayer has always been religious.‟”) (citation omitted).  
We will again cite to the following example as an illustration: 
 
Dear Heavenly Father, among Your many 
blessings, we thank You for the beautiful 
summer weather and especially for the much 
needed rain. We thank You also for the 
wonderful school year that has just ended with 
so many successes, awards, and 
accomplishments of our students and staff once 
again. We ask Your continued blessings on 
those among us who have devoted so much 
time, energy, and expertise to the betterment of 
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this district and who are now stepping down. 
Given them peace, health, and happiness in the 
days to come. Be with our people who have 
suffered illness or injury this year, and grant 
them a quick return to normal life. Comfort the 
families of those who are lost to us and give 
them strength in their time of grief. Protect all 
who are here and return them to us safely in the 
fall. We ask that You continue to guide and 
direct us in . . . our decision-making, so that 
every child in this district receives the 
educational skills to be all he/she can be. We 
ask these things and all others in the name of 
Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen. 
 
Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 547. 
 
 Given that the prayers recited are nearly exclusively 
Christian in nature, including explicit references to God or 
Jesus Christ or the Lord, we find it difficult to accept the 
proposition that a “reasonable person” would not find that the 
primary effect of the Prayer Policy was to advance religion. 
 
 Appellees maintain that the purpose and effect of the 
prayer is to solemnify the meetings.  It is true, as the previous 
example reveals, that the prayers ask for guidance on school-
related matters.  In this respect the Indian River policy is 
similar to the policy the Supreme Court considered in Santa 
Fe, whose stated purpose was also to “solemnize the event.”  
530 U.S. at 306.  The Court acknowledged that “[a] religious 
message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an 
event.”  Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306.  However, the fact that the 
purpose of the policy is to solemnify the Board meetings does 
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not mean that it does not also impermissibly endorse religion.  
The two are separate components of our inquiry.  See Borden, 
523 F.3d at 177-78 (“First, the inquiry is not whether Borden 
intends to endorse religion, but whether a reasonable 
observer, with knowledge of the history and context of the 
display, would conclude that he is endorsing religion.”).  The 
second prong of the Lemon test asks us to adopt the 
viewpoint of a reasonable observer, regardless of what 
purpose the Board might have had.  In light of that obligation, 
we find that a reasonable observer would view the content of 
the Board‟s prayers as promoting religion.16 
 
 We are also instructed to consider the “history and 
ubiquity” of the challenged practice in assessing how a 
reasonable person would view it.  Our decision in Borden 
showcases the significance of the history and context of a 
contested practice to its constitutionality.  In Borden, we 
tackled the head high school football coach‟s practice of 
“engag[ing] in the silent act[] of bowing his head during his 
team‟s pre-meal grace and taking a knee with his team during 
a locker-room prayer.”  Id. at 158.  Borden, who had been the 
                                                          
16
 Since enacting the Policy, the Board recites a disclaimer 
prior to delivering the prayer (although the disclaimer is not 
mandated by the Policy).  However, the disclaimer does not 
render the Board‟s practice constitutional.  See Black Horse 
Pike, 84 F.3d at 1482 (“The disclaimer required . . . does help 
to recapture some of the separation between church and state 
that has been obscured by the state‟s control over the 
graduation. However, the Board cannot sanction coerced 
participation in a religious observance merely by disclaiming 
responsibility for the content of the ceremony.”). 
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head football coach since 1983, had a long history of 
engaging in similar conduct: 
 
For twenty-three years, Borden led the team in a 
pre-game prayer in the locker room. During that 
same period of time, Borden orchestrated a pre-
meal grace for his team. He originally had a 
chaplain conduct the pre-meal grace. This 
practice changed only after school officials 
asked him to stop; then he had the chaplain 
write the grace and he selected seniors on the 
team to recite it. Additionally, during at least 
three seasons, Borden led the team in the first 
prayer of the season. Both of these activities, 
the locker room preparations and the pre-game 
meals, were school-sponsored events. 
 
Id. at 176.  Relying in part on “the history of Borden‟s 
conduct with the team‟s prayers” we found that “his acts 
cross the line and constitute an unconstitutional endorsement 
of religion.”  Id. at 178.  We drew support from Santa Fe, 
where in addressing the constitutionality of a prayer recited 
over loud speakers at football games, the Supreme Court 
“considered the many years of pre-game prayers at the 
school, and the evolution of the policy, including the name 
„Prayer at Football Games‟ and its stated purpose.”  Id. at 176 
(citing Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308-09). 
 
 The history and context of the Indian River Policy is 
similarly revealing.  Prayer in school and at school events has 
been a contentious issue in the Indian River School District 
for some time.  In fact, the Board‟s decision to write an 
official prayer policy grew out of this debate and efforts to 
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stall a possible civil action against the Board.  The original 
event to kindle this heated debate was the Indian River 
School District‟s policy of permitting official prayer at school 
graduations.  While that claim eventually settled, the 
underlying events inform our understanding of the history of 
prayer in the District. In 2004, recall, the School District 
invited a pastor to recite an “invocation and benediction” at 
one of the district high school graduation ceremonies.  Indian 
River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 528.  The benediction “explicitly 
invoked Jesus Christ. For example, in the benediction, 
Reverend Fike stated:  „Heavenly Father . . . direct 
[graduates] into the truth, and eventually the truth that comes 
by knowing Jesus.‟”  Id. 
 
 Mona Dobrich, one of the original plaintiffs, 
complained about the prayer during the Board‟s regularly-
scheduled meeting on June 14, 2004.  Id. at 529.  Dobrich‟s 
complaint garnered significant media attention from 
Delaware newspapers.  News that the ACLU was threatening 
to sue the District spread quickly and the complaint was 
widely reported by the local news media.  At the Board‟s July 
27, 2004 meeting, “[t]hirteen residents, including five 
religious leaders, spoke up both for and against allowing 
prayer at the district‟s functions, particularly graduation 
ceremonies.”17  JA 81.  “[M]ore than 100 people attended [the 
meeting] with the majority interpreting Dobrich‟s request as a 
move to stifle their religious freedom and to degrade the 
moral fiber of the community.”  JA 81.  One newspaper 
described some of the comments made: 
 
                                                          
17
 A different newspaper report stated that 11 people made 
statements.  
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Pastor Richard Blades . . . spoke of Biblical 
mandate for prayer in Jesus‟ name, adding, “our 
school district has prayed in Jesus‟ name for 
many, many years.”  Pastor Marvin Morris 
received hardy applause after suggesting doing 
away with prayer will lead to an erosion of [the] 
community‟s foundations.  Another offered the 
opinion that if it hadn‟t been for prayer, the 
school district could be in a greater mess than it 
currently is.  
 
Those on the other side of the debate argued for 
tolerance and acceptance of all faiths . . . .  
 
Mona Dobrich, the Jewish mother who first 
brought the issue to the public‟s attention, read 
a prepared speech, charging the district with a 




 The Board grew concerned that it would be the subject 
of a lawsuit.  Dobrich, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 371.  The District 
Court explained what happened next: 
 
On August 23, 2004, the Board convened a 
special meeting to discuss prayer at the 
beginning of Board meetings. According to the 
minutes of that session, which lasted several 
hours, “several board members expressed that 
their constituents d[id] not want the Board to 
change its practice of opening the meetings with 
a prayer.”  
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Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 529.  The Board‟s 
next regularly-scheduled meeting took place the next 
day.  This meeting: 
 
attracted more than twice the attendance of a 
typical public meeting. At the beginning of the 
meeting, then-Board President Walls asked 
Board Member Hattier to “lead the Board in a 
moment of prayer.”  Several members of the 
crowd applauded. President Walls gaveled the 
room back to order.  [Board] Member Hattier 
then gave [another prayer]. . . . . During the 
portion of the meeting devoted to public 
comments, several attendees spoke in favor of 
continuing the practice of having an invocation 






 A newspaper reported that approximately 800 people 
attended the meeting, “a majority . . . [of whom] supported 
the board‟s decision to open with prayer and continue the 
practice at commencement.”  JA 202.  Jane Doe testified that 
attendees were shouting “Amen” and “hallelujah” during the 
meeting.  JA 135.  The newspaper article confirmed this: 
attendees “shouted out „Amen‟ or „Praise Jesus‟ after 
scripture passages were quoted during the public comment 
period.”  JA 202.  The article goes on to describe the 
attendees holding signs reading “Jesus is the Light of the 
Word” and “Let us Pray, God is Listening.”  JA 202.  In 
addition, “[l]ocal churches and community members 
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organized a prayer vigil before the meeting.”  JA at 203.  One 
community member “present[ed] the board with a petition 
signed by 320 people who want to see prayer continued at 
graduation.”  JA at 203.  The meeting was also attended by 
several state representatives.  During the public comment 
period, one of them stated to the Board, “You have the public 
behind you . . . If you do not do the right thing, the public will 
take you out, not the ACLU.”  JA 87.  Board Member Bireley 
conceded that the vast majority of comments at the meeting 
were “probably” intended to be intimidating to opponents of 
school board prayer.  JA 415. 
 
 This history is illuminating.  This sequence of events 
shows that the Board‟s Prayer Policy is closely linked to the 
desire to maintain prayer at Indian River school events, 
including at graduations.  After all, it was in response to this 
community uproar that the Board was compelled to draft a 
formal Prayer Policy.  Indian River, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 529.  
These events also show how the public viewed the prayer 
issue.  As exemplified by the August 24, 2004 meeting, there 
was clearly broad support among community members for the 
practice of prayer at the School Board meetings and District 
graduations.  Not only did most of the attendees support the 
Board‟s practice, but their conduct reveals that in the minds 
of many, the issue of prayer at the Board meetings and 
graduations was closely intertwined with religion.  In Board 
Member Helms‟s words, “it was apparent to me that not only 
did they want to take away prayer before graduation, but they 
wanted to take my right to pray at a Board meeting.”  JA 767.  
The Policy was drafted in order to safeguard against a 
potential lawsuit challenging the Board‟s unwritten practice 
of praying at every public meeting.  The Policy was also 
drafted in an atmosphere of contention and hostility towards 
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those who wanted prayers to be eliminated from school 
events.  A reasonable person aware of this history would 
conclude that the primary effect of the Board‟s Policy was to 
endorse religion. 
 
3.  The Excessive Entanglement Prong 
 
 Part three of the Lemon test provides that government 
conduct may “not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. “[T]o 
assess entanglement, we have looked to „the character and 
purpose of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the 
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship 
between the government and religious authority.‟”  Agostini 
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (quoting Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 615).  We must also bear in mind that “excessive 
entanglement” “requires more than mere „[i]nteraction 
between church and state,‟ for some level of interaction has 
always been „tolerated.‟”  Child Evangelism Fellowship of 
N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 534 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233). 
 
 Several institutional aspects of the recitation of the 
prayer are troubling.  The prayers are not spontaneous, but a 
formal part of the Board‟s activities.  The Board explicitly 
decided that a prayer or a moment of silence should be part of 
every School Board meeting.  The “decis[ion] that an 
invocation and a benediction should be given . . . is a choice 
attributable to the State.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.  That level of 
“involvement,” the Supreme Court cautions, is “troubling.”  
Id.  In this case, the Policy resulted from, and was sanctioned 
by, the Board‟s institutional authority in that it was enacted 
through a vote. 
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 Second, the prayers are recited in official meetings that 
are completely controlled by the state. The Board sets the 
agenda for the meeting, chooses what individuals may speak 
and when, and in this context, recites a prayer to initiate the 
meeting. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the prayer 
practices suggest excessive government entanglement. 
 
 The practice and the Prayer Policy bear two additional 
hallmarks of state involvement:  the Board composes and 
recites the prayer.  Government participation in the 
composition of prayer is precisely the type of activity that the 
Establishment Clause guards against.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 
590 (“[O]ur precedents do not permit school officials to assist 
in composing prayers as an incident to a formal exercise for 
their students.”).  In this case, the Board always composes the 
prayers recited at the public meetings.  Per the Policy‟s stated 
terms, only Board Members are permitted to “offer a prayer 
or request a moment of silence.”  The Policy ensures that a 
prayer or moment of silence is offered at every meeting, since 
the duty rotates in the case that a member declines to 
“exercise this opportunity.”  Unsurprisingly, Board Members 
who volunteer for this duty take their responsibility seriously, 
carefully choosing the words and message they wish to 
deliver. 
 
 The composition of the prayer is “a hallmark of state 
involvement.”  See Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 
1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The ability to regulate the 
content of speech is a hallmark of state involvement.”).  The 
Supreme Court has found that when government has been 
involved in the composition of prayer recited in front of 
students, this violates the principles of the Establishment 
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Clause.  In Engel, the Supreme Court struck down a school 
prayer that was composed by New York State officials.  The 
Court found it significant that the “prayer was composed by 
government officials as part of a governmental program to 
further religious beliefs.”  Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.  At the very 
least, the Court explained, “the constitutional prohibition 
against laws respecting an establishment of religion must . . . 
mean that in this country it is no part of the business of 
government to compose official prayers for any group of the 
American people to recite as a part of a religious program 
carried on by government.”  Id.  In Lee, the Court again drew 
attention to the excessive control of the state over the content 
of the prayer, explaining that “[t]he State‟s role did not end 
with the decision to include a prayer and with the choice of a 
clergyman. [The principal] provided [the rabbi] with a copy 
of the „Guidelines for Civic Occasions,‟ and advised him that 
his prayers should be nonsectarian. Through these means the 
principal directed and controlled the content of the prayers.” 
505 U.S. at 588.  Citing Engel, the Lee Court confirmed that 
the government could play “no part” in the composition of 
“official prayers.”  Id. 
 
 Another element of the Policy revealing excessive 
entanglement is that the Board recites the prayer.  In doing so, 
the state‟s involvement goes further than in Santa Fe, where 
the student body elected a student volunteer, and in Engel, 
where students recited a prayer composed by the state.  
Because of the Board President‟s procedure for implementing 
the Policy, there is never a meeting where a prayer or a 
moment of silence is not given. 
 
 These circumstances are akin to those considered by 
the Fourth Circuit in Mellen v. Bunting, where the Court of 
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Appeals tackled the constitutionality of a daily prayer recited 
before dinner at a state military college.  327 F.3d 355 (4th 
Cir. 2003).  In Mellen, the prayer was delivered by a chaplain 
employed by the state, and thus, as in this case, the 
government both composed and recited the prayer.  The 
Fourth Circuit found that the military college‟s prayer policy 
was unconstitutional under the Lemon test.  In assessing the 
“excessive entanglement” prong, the court found that the state 
“composed, mandated, and monitored a daily prayer for its 
cadets” and that, in doing so, “[the school] has taken a 
position on what constitutes appropriate religious worship—
an entanglement with religious activity that is forbidden by 
the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 375. “[T]he Establishment 
Clause prohibits a state from promoting religion by authoring 
and promoting prayer for its citizens.”  Id. 
 
 Coles is also instructive.  The Sixth Circuit found that 
the school board practice of reciting a prayer at every meeting 
violated all three prongs of the Lemon test.  Discussing the 
excessive entanglement prong, the Court of Appeals found 
the board‟s involvement “indistinguishable from the situation 
in Lee.”  Coles, 171 F.3d at 385.  The following features 
revealed the imprimatur of the state:  “The school board 
decided to include prayer in its public meetings, chose which 
member from the local religious community would give those 
prayers, and has more recently had the school board president 
himself compose and deliver prayers to those in the 
audience.”  Id. 
 
 The Board directs us to four aspects of the Prayer 
Policy which, in its view, show that there is no excessive 
entanglement.  First, the Board Policy permits all types of 
prayers.  Second, all Board Members are permitted to “lead 
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the group in accordance with his own conscience.”  Appellee 
Br. 52.  Third, Board Members and the public are not 
required to participate in the prayer—“[t]hey are free to 
listen, to stand in respectful silence, or simply to think of 
something else.  Those who are truly bothered . . . may 
temporarily leave.”  Appellee Br. 53.  Fourth, the Policy does 
not require the expenditure of public funds. 
 
 We are not persuaded that these elements of the prayer 
practice disentangle the Board from its involvement in 
religion.  While it is true that Board Members have significant 
flexibility in deciding what the prayer should say, they are 
still government actors composing and delivering prayer.  
Moreover, the record shows that for the most part, the prayers 
recited refer to one particular faith. We earlier rejected the 
Board‟s argument that a student‟s ability to dissent from the 
prayer transforms the practice into a constitutional one.  
Finally, we have never required that public spending be an 
element of excessive state entanglement in religion. 
 
 In short, the indicia of state involvement in the Board‟s 
Prayer Policy are overwhelming.  Therefore, we find that the 
Board‟s complete control over the Policy, combined with its 
explicit sectarian content, rises above the level of interaction 
between church and state that the Establishment Clause 
permits. 
 
C.  The Endorsement Test 
 
 The endorsement test is essentially “the same” as the 
second Lemon prong.  Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1486.  
Because of the reasons we set forth for finding that the Policy 
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did not survive the “effect prong” of Lemon, we also find that 




 If the history of this litigation has shown us anything, 
it is that the proper role of prayer in the Indian River school 
system has been the subject of sincere and passionate debate.  
Yet “[t]he question is not the good faith of the school in 
attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but 
the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all.”  Lee, 
505 U.S. at 588-89.  In arriving at this outcome, we 
recognize, as the Supreme Court has, that “religion has been 
closely identified with our history and government.”  
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212.  But we take to heart the 
observation in Engel that “[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor 
antireligious to say that each separate government in this 
country should stay out of the business of writing or 
sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious 
function to the people themselves.”  370 U.S. at 435.  In this 
regard, the Indian River School Board Prayer Policy rises 
above the level of interaction between church and state that 
the Establishment Clause permits. 
 
 For the reasons above, we will reverse the District 
Court and grant summary judgment in favor of appellants. 
